The eventual fall of the Ottoman Empire Essay Example for Free

The eventual fall of the Ottoman Empire Essay How far did the reforms during the period 1826-39 contribute to the eventual fall of the Ottoman Empire? The Ottoman Empire (1299-1924), founded as a medieval dynasty, collapsed and re-emerged as a modern constitutional state in less than seven centuries. The crucial question is why? What caused so momentous a transformation? There is much historical debate as to the causes for, and underlying factors in the empires collapse. Ive focused my study on the reforms passed during the period 1826-39, for I would consider these central in understanding the nature of the empires transformation. The years between 1826 and 1839 were a key turning point in the empires history and relations with foreign powers. In this period, crucial wars were fought, reforms ratified and institutions dismantled. Sultan Abdulmecid declared in 1839, [my empire] will prove [] that it is worthy of a prominent place in the concert of civilised nations. As Suraiya Farooqhi et al, in their detailed study of the latter centuries of the empires history put it, such events are important for they physically acknowledged, reaffirmed, and maintained the new centralizing/westernizing course of the Ottoman state.i Historians, whose studies are based foremost on European sources e.g. Lord Kinross and Feroz Ahmadii, tend to see the reforms as progressive, and attribute the empires collapse to a failure to industrialise. On the other hand, other historians, e.g. E.Eldemiii and Professor Maksudoglu, as well as Stanford J. Shawiv, all of whom rely more heavily on Ottoman sources, see the reforms as far more degenerate. Maksudoglu suggests Osmanli [Ottoman] sources have been neglected and ignored. v Shaw argues that Ottoman history has been discussed but always from the European perspective, through the light of European prejudice, and largely on the basis of European sources.vi It is due to a neglect of Ottoman sources that many historians have misinterpreted the causes of the empires collapse; there exists an unnatural bias towards the conventional European justification. As Goodwin suggests, foreign historians tend to blame the international forces of capitalism their capital, their force and suggest that the West reduced the empire to a peripheral producer of raw materials.vii Nevertheless, most historians agree that European influence proved to be of ever-increasing significance in determining the empires transformations. Ahmad suggests that ministers from the Sublime Porte visited Europe, in particular France, more frequently and returned home impressed with what they saw and learned.viii In the 1830s, an Ottoman poet wrote: Go to Paris, young sir, if you have any wish; if you have not been to Paris, you have not come into the world.ix Although the poet was probably writing for the purposes of entertainment, not necessarily for historical accuracy, the extract offers insight into not only the opinion of the poet, but his influence on the audiences perception. The likelihood of the sources reliability, although anonymous, is further strengthened when looked at in the context of Eastern, in particular Muslim, society. The oral tradition was, and still is of significant importance. The point made by Ahmad and the poet shows how the Ottoman view of Europe shifted significantly in the period; Europe had something to offer the empire. Ministers visiting Paris understood the basis of European superiority and in turn saw the need to drastically alter their own system. The Janissary purge of 1826 was first of the Sultans drastic alterations. It was impossible to introduce military and administrative reform whilst faced with the staunch opposition of the conservative ulema [Islamic religious authority], supported by the Janissaries. Ahmad agrees; as he puts it, such schemes were impossible to introduce while the conservatives were so strongly entrenched. Backed by the Janissaries, they were sufficiently powerful to depose reformist sultans and execute their grand viziers.x As Mansel points out, the official history of enumerated acts of insubordination by the corps [stretched] back to the reigns of Selim I and Suleyman.xi By combining evidence from these sources, we can see that the abolition of the corps, also known as the the purging of the garden of the empire of savage and useless weeds, or the Blessed Event was inevitable. The abolition removed the final vestiges of conservatism, thus making it possible for foreign governments to influence the Sultan and the Sublime Porte [Ottoman government]. It was the beginning of an era of almost continuous reform, as Mansel put it, it seemed that only the Janissaries had delayed the empires return to the openness of the reign of Fatih and the early sixteenth century.xii The Janissaries created a climate of fear and disorder. The ulema had largely supported the Janissary reign of misrule, preferring conservative anarchy to innovation and reform.xiii By 1826 the Janissaries had managed to alienate the ulema, and even the common citizens were against them. This was partly due to the treatment of the citizens by the Janissaries and also, as Ahmad suggests, because of the Janissarys poor performance in the Greek insurrection of 1821. Mahmud II waited eighteen years to abolish the Janissaries, who had overthrown and executed his predecessor, Selim III. They were becoming a law unto themselves and were now even unable to fight; they were less soldiers, and more private citizens who just so happened to be on the military payroll. My argument is strengthened by R. G. Grant, who agrees that the Janissaries, once so admired, became a weakness through their political intriguing and their conservatism, which obstructed military reform.xiv Although Grant is correct, the Janissaries did obstruct military reform, they helped to defend the empires citizens against the Sultans excesses, as Maksudoglu argues, [after 1826] top officials lived a luxurious and corrupt life, while the government borrowed substantial sums of money from European powers, and inflation reached unprecedented levels. xv As Goodwin suggests it was no longer the Ottoman peasant to whom the sultans had to answer for their extravagance. There were no Janissaries now to growl at the dissipation of the court.xvi In 1875, due to the Sultans lavish spending, the empire declared bankruptcy. There is no doubt that this contributed to its collapse. The ulema, fearing a similar fate [as the Janissaries] offered the government no resistance. As Mansel put it, [the ulema] fearing similar annihilation if they opposed the government, [they] kept silent.xvii The Blessed Event was more revenge, than considered reform. As Cunningham notes, years later a British general watched with his own eyes as the Sultan supervised workmen striking the Janissary bonnets off gravestones in a Pera burial-ground.xviii Goodwin substantiating Cunninghams argument states: Janissary headstones, topped by the cocky turban of the order, were knocked over.xix Claims of acts of vengeance are supported by the eye-witness account of British Dragoman, Bartolomeo Pisani: Every corrner of the town is searched and every Janissary officer that is caught is conducted to the Grand Vizier and by him ordered to death [].xx The 1826 Janissary purge paved the way for further reform; without the Janissaries, the conservatives were powerless, and in a state of disarray. The abolition of the Janissaries impacted significantly upon Ottoman society. Suraiya Farooqhi et al propose that in Constantinople, the destruction of the Janissary corps had economic and social, as well as political implications: in Istanbul [Constantinople] and many other cities, the Janissaries had played a crucial role in the Ottoman urban economy.xxi According to Maksudoglu, many shopkeepers held paid Janissary posts.xxii The Anglo-Turkish Convention (1838) abolished protectionist policies. Charlotte Jirousek, an expert in consumption studies, agrees that the convention formally established a policy of free trade and removed the longstanding protections on domestic manufacturers.xxiii Suraiya Farooqhi et al argue that the 1838 Anglo-Turkish Convention eliminated state monopolies and removed many of the barriers in the way of European merchants.xxiv The convention had a devastating impact on Ottoman manufacturers and craftsmen, Mansel agrees that the convention opened the empire to a flood of British goods and ruined many Ottoman crafts.xxv The destruction of the Janissary corps (1826) and the Anglo-Turkish Convention (1838) further integrated Ottoman and European economies, just as the 1839 Tanzimat decree more closely aligned the Middle Eastern with Western political structures. Mansel argues, it was the Sultans reason and his determination to save his monarchy, which drove him to modernise.xxvi Ahmad suggests that the reformers had become more convinced that the empires penetration by industrial Europe and its absorption into the expanding world market was the only way for the empire to survive and prosper.xxvii Though a valid argument, attempting to achieve absorption into the world market without first addressing pressing domestic social concerns deemed the economic reforms counter-productive. Mansel agrees, as a result of the 1838 treaty, beggars became more common on the streets of the city [Constantinople].xxviii Glenny cites a failure to industrialise as a principle cause behind the empires collapse. Though his argument is understandable, it isnt entirely accurate. There were attempts to industrialise, in so far as to mirror European industrial development. According to Mansel, the phrases English standards and European standards were constantly recurring in official letters. xxix The Armenian Dardian dynasty was central to the Ottoman industrialisation process. Hovhannes Amira Dardian, an international entrepreneur visited England and France at government expense to study the latest industrial techniques and to purchase steam engines. In November 1831, the first Ottoman newspaper, Takvim-i Vekayi (Calendar of Events), or Moniteur Ottoman was printed in both Ottoman and French editions. Disagreement between Glenny and Mansel ought not to be seen as a weakness in my argument since Glenny is focusing specifically on the Ottoman guild system and not on general industrialisation. Between 1826 and 1839 the Ottoman Empire struggled to control key provinces; Kinross describes the empire as continuing to shrink in extent, retaining despite decay its internal organs while losing through disruption its outlying limbs.xxx Though, Maksudoglu argues that European powers decided to end Osmanli suzerainty over Greece.xxxi Disagreement between Kinross and Maksudoglu may be more apparent than real, since Maksudoglu, as he confesses, is founding his assertions primarily on Ottoman sources. European influence proved pivotal in inciting the territories to rise up against Ottoman governance. The War of Independence exposed the weaknesses of the Sultans reforms. As Mansel agrees, the Sultans reforms did not help the Ottoman Empire in its struggle against the Greek revolt.xxxii The War of Greek Independence began 25 March 1821 and is certainly one of the central elements in bringing about the case for reform. The War of Greek Independence, though initially taking the form of a Greek cultural renaissance, was in fact an attempt by the Greeks to actively destabilize the Ottoman Empire; as Glenny suggests: the Greek rebellions of 1821 were not spontaneous reactions to deteriorating social and economic circumstances.xxxiii By June 1827, after six years of war, the Ottomans under the leadership of the commander Reshid Pasha, succeeded in subjugating continental Greece, this ought to have signalled the end of the war, instead occupation of mainland Greece prompted British, French, and Russian intervention; the Russians, in particular, put immense pressure on the Ottomans. Maksudoglu, strengthening the line of argument, argues that the Russians were guilty of inciting the Greeks to revolt.xxxiv The Austrians under Metternich favoured the suppression of the rebellious Greeks. The British, encouraged by the ambassador Sir Stratford Canning, fought the Ottoman government. According to Mansel, in an effort to persuade the Ottoman government to recognise Greece, European ambassadors, who felt physically threatened in Constantinople, left for the island of Poros between December 1827 and June 1829.xxxv On 20 October 1827, the Ottoman fleet was completely obliterated at the Battle of Navarino. The support of British, French and Russian navies for the Greeks insurgents violated the 1827 Treaty of London in which the three great powers had committed themselves to securing an armistice between the Greeks and the Ottomans, without taking part in the hostilities between contending parities.xxxvi The British, as suggested by Glenny, were egged on by the philhellenic sentiments of Sir Stratford Canning.xxxvii Kinross agrees: the great powers, the rival expansionist empires of Austria-Hungary and Russia, intrigued from behind their adjoining frontiers, marking out spheres of influence, stirring up satellites, and preparing to move when the moment was ripe.xxxviii The great powers crucially interfered in the affairs of the Ottoman provinces, destabilising the empire. Agreement between Glenny and Kinross reinforces the argument. In 1832, the Ottoman Army was convincingly defeated in Syria by Mehmet Alis Egyptian army led by his son, Ibrahim Pasha. The Sultans new army made up initially of ex-Janissaries, proved just as ineffective. Kinross describes the Sultans new troops as being not yet a match for so practiced an enemyxxxix. Marshal Marmont, a former marshal of Napoleon I and Charles X proclaimed: they are not troops; they are a reunion of men the character of whose general appearance is a miserable and humiliated air. It is clear that they are aware of their weakness.xl Agreement between Kinross and Marshal Marmont strengthens the argument that the 1826 Janissary purge was, to a large extent, a failure. The Sultan succeeded in getting rid of the Janissaries, but failed to effectively replace them. As Count Helmuth von Moltke, who in 1835 was brought from Prussia to train the army, put it: it was indispensable for him to clear the site before setting up his own building. [] The first part of his great tas k the Sultan carried through with perspicacity and resolution; in the second he failed.xli From the outset, Mehmet Ali was a thorn in the side of the Sublime Porte, as Kinross put it, he was the Sultans menacing vassalxlii. The Sultan was forced to turn to the Ottomans traditional enemies, the Russians. According to Kinross, this was because British Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston, who at the time was pursuing a policy of retrenchment of his armed forces, rejected his plea for aidxliii. Though on the other hand, Lord Ponsonby is said to have accused the Sultan of throwing his crown into the lap of the Emperor Nicholas and reminded him of the power of the British to stop the Russians and Mehmet Alixliv. In 1840 the British forced Ibrahim Pasha from Syria and bombarded Alexandria. Mehmet Ali pulled his troops out of Crete and Arabia and accepted the hereditary governorship of Egypt. By 1839 the Ottoman Empire had significantly deteriorated. The Tanzimat decrees (1839) were issued in exchange for support in Egypt. As Goodwin argues, in 1839, in return for the powers putting pressure on Mehmet Ali to accept hereditary governorship of Egypt, he issued [] a reformist charter.xlv Kinross describes the reforms beginning in 1839 as nothing less than the transformation of Turkey from a medieval empire, based on the principles of Islam into a modern constitutional state, based equally on the secular principles of the West.xlvi The assertions of both Goodwin and Kinross strengthen my argument; the Tanzimat issued in secular principles, although it was promulgated in order to receive foreign support in Egypt. Western powers used the artificial doctrine of nationalism as a means by which to incite the non-Muslim citizens of the empire to rebel against the Government. As Goodwin put it, nationalism was a pretence.xlvii My argument is strengthened by Maksudogluxlviii, Eccleshall et al, and in part, by Glennyxlix. Kinross adds, inspired by nationalist feelings, they sought to break free of the empire and carve up the country between them.l According to Goodwin, the Philhellenic movement is often accredited with being responsible for revitalising the Greek spirit and alerting the western governments to the suffering of the empires Greek Christians. This argument is both misleading and certainly untrue. The majority of the Philhellenes were more driven by personal greed than by a desire to see Greek independence; all observers, both Greek and non-Greek, exempt Lord Byron from this criticism. Glenny also points out that: Turkish rule over parts of Greece was no longer viable.li The tributes paid to Byron after his death, by both European politicians and literary figures pressured the British government to adopt a more interventionist stance.lii Most historians agree that the preservation of the Ottoman Empire was in the best interests of the great powers. According to the British Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh, barbarous as it is; Turkey forms in the system of Europe a necessary partliii. Wellington declared: The Ottoman Empire stands not for the benefit of the Turks but of Christian Europe.liv A Russian secret government committee in 1828 came to the conclusion that the advantages of the preservation of the Ottoman Empire outweigh its disadvantages (since it would probably be replaced by powers under influence of Britain or France).lv In the context of nineteenth century Europe, the preservation of the Ottoman Empire was a necessity for the great powers, but only in the sense that it was essential that the empire didnt come under rival control. The agreement between Castlereagh and Wellington focuses specifically on retaining the balance of power, and not on preserving the empire as a goal in and of itself. In conclusion, the reforms passed in the period 1826-1839 significantly contributed to the empires collapse. Although the Janissary purge, as argued by Ahmad and Mansel, was necessary as they were no longer effective; without them, the Sultan was allowed to accumulate debt unhindered. Debt led to inflation, soaring food prices and general discontent. The ulema, fearing similar treatment [as the Janissaries] were forced to remain silent. The Janissary purge failed to cure the problem of an ineffective army, and merely served to avenge the acts of disorder carried out by the corps. Without the Janissaries, and with the ulema now impotent, there was no defence against harmful reform e.g. the 1838 Anglo-Turkish Convention flooded the empire with British goods and ruined many Ottoman manufacturers, other reforms, though not necessarily harmful, proved nevertheless ineffective. As Kinross points out by Metternich and others [] [they] were cynically dismissed as an essay in window dressing.lvi If it were not for the Janissary Purge, then it is possible that the empire would have been in a better position to defend itself against foreign intervention and the Sultans excesses. i Suraiya Farooqhi, Bruce McGowan, Donald Quartaert and Serket Pamuk An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire Volume II 1600 1914 Cambridge University Press (1994) 2 Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, Routledge (1993) iii E.Eldem, Pride and Privilege: A History of Ottoman Orders, Medals and Decorations, Istanbul (2004), p35 iv Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Cambridge University Press (1991) 5 Mehmet Maksudoglu, Osmanli History 1289-1922, International Islamic University, Malaysia (1999), pxxv vi Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Cambridge University Press (1991), pvii vii Jason Goodwin, Lords of the Horizons A History of the Ottoman Empire, Chatto Windus, London, (1998), p238 viii Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, Routledge (1993), p24 ix Anonymous, quoted in Phillip Mansel, Constantinople City of the Worlds Desire 1453-1924, John Murray (Publishers), (1995), p256 10 Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, Routledge (1993), p24 xi Phillip Mansel, Constantinople City of the Worlds Desire 1453-1924, John Murray (Publishers), (1995), p238 xii Ibid p249 13 Jason Goodwin, Lords of the Horizons A History of the Ottoman Empire, Chatto Windus, London, (1998), p.292 14 R.G.Grant, Battle a visual journey through 5,000 years of combat, DK, (2005), pg34 xv Mehmet Maksudoglu, Osmanli History 1289-1922, International Islamic University, Malaysia (1999), p214 xvi Jason Goodwin, Lords of the Horizons A History of the Ottoman Empire, Chatto Windus, London, (1998), p311 xvii Phillip Mansel, Constantinople City of the Worlds Desire 1453-1924, John Murray (Publishers), (1995), p274 xviii Allan Cunningham, Anglo-Ottoman Encounters in the Age of Revolution, (1993), p34 xix Jason Goodwin, Lords of the Horizons A History of the Ottoman Empire, Chatto Windus, London, (1998), p298 xx Bartolomeo Pisani, quoted in, Phillip Mansel, Constantinople City of the Worlds Desire 1453-1924, John Murray (Publishers), (1995), p238 21 Suraiya Farooqhi, Bruce McGowan, Donald Quartaert and Serket Pamuk An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire Volume II 1600 1914 Cambridge University Press (1994) xxii Mehmet Maksudoglu, Osmanli History 1289-1922, International Islamic University, Malaysia (1999), p209 xxiii Charlotte Jirousek The Transition to Mass Fashion System and Dress in the Later Ottoman Empire p213-230 Donald Quartaert, editor Consumption Studies and the History of the Ottoman Empire xxiv Suraiya Farooqhi, Bruce McGowan, Donald Quartaert and Serket Pamuk An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire Volume II 1600 1914 Cambridge University Press (1994) xxv Phillip Mansel, Constantinople City of the Worlds Desire 1453-1924, John Murray (Publishers), (1995), p258 xxvi Ibid, p250 26 Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, Routledge (1993), p24 xxviii Ibid p258 xxix Ibid p254 xxx Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire, Morrow Quill Paperbacks, New York, (1977), p.440 xxxi Mehmet Maksudoglu, Osmanli History 1289-1922, International Islamic University, Malaysia (1999), p210 xxxii Phillip Mansel, Constantinople City of the Worlds Desire 1453-1924, John Murray (Publishers), (1995), p247 xxxiii Misha Glenny, The Balkans 1804-1999 Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, (Granata Books), London (1999) p26 xxxiv Mehmet Maksudoglu, Osmanli History 1289-1922, International Islamic University, Malaysia (1999), p208 xxxv Phillip Mansel, Constantinople City of the Worlds Desire 1453-1924, John Murray (Publishers), (1995), p248 xxxvi The Treaty of London (1827), quoted in, Misha Glenny, The Balkans 1804-1999 Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, (Granata Books), London (1999) p34 xxxvii Ibid xxxviii Lord Kinross, Ataturk A biography of Mustafa Kemal, father of modern Turkey, William Morrow and Company, New York, (1978), p8 xxxix Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire, Morrow Quill Paperbacks, New York, (1977), p467 xl Marshal Marmont, quoted in Phillip Mansel, Constantinople City of the Worlds Desire 1453-1924, John Murray (Publishers), (1995), p259 xli Count Helmuth von Moltke, quoted in, Jason Goodwin, Lords of the Horizons A History of the Ottoman Empire, Chatto Windus, London, (1998), p302 xlii Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire, Morrow Quill Paperbacks, New York, (1977), p467 xliii Ibid p468 xliv Phillip E. Moseley, Russian Diplomacy and the opening of the Eastern Question in 1838-1839, Harvard, (1934), p78 xlv Jason Goodwin, Lords of the Horizons A History of the Ottoman Empire, Chatto Windus, London, (1998), pg304 xlvi Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire, Morrow Quill Paperbacks, New York, (1977), p440 xlvii Jason Goodwin, Lords of the Horizons A History of the Ottoman Empire, Chatto Windus, London, (1998), pg295 xlviii Mehmet Maksudoglu, Osmanli History 1289-1922, International Islamic University, Malaysia (1999), p207 xlix Robert Eccleshall, Vincent Geoghegan, Richard Jay, Rick Wilford, Political Ideologies, Unwin Hyman, London (1990) l Lord Kinross, Ataturk A biography of Mustafa Kemal, father of modern Turkey, William Morrow and Company, New York, (1978), p8 li Misha Glenny, The Balkans 1804-1999 Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, (Granata Books), London (1999) p35 lii Ibid, Lord Castlereagh liii Ibid p248, The Duke of Wellington liv Ibid lv Ibid lvi Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire, Morrow Quill Paperbacks, New York, (1977), p475 Bibliography Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, Routledge (1993) Allan Cunningham, Anglo-Ottoman Encounters in the Age of Revolution, Routledge (1993) Robert Eccleshall, Vincent Geoghegan, Richard Jay, Rick Wilford, Political Ideologies, Unwin Hyman, London (1990) E.Eldem, Pride and Privilege: A History of Ottoman Orders, Medals and Decorations, Istanbul (2004) Suraiya Farooqhi, Bruce McGowan, Donald Quartaert and Serket Pamuk An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire Volume II 1600 1914 Cambridge University Press (1994) Misha Glenny, The Balkans 1804-1999 Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, (Granata Books), London (1999) Jason Goodwin, Lords of the Horizons A History of the Ottoman Empire, Chatto Windus, London, (1998) R.G.Grant, Battle a visual journey through 5,000 years of combat, DK, (2005) Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire; The Classical Age 1300-1600, London (1973) Charlotte Jirousek The Transition to Mass Fashion System and Dress in the Later Ottoman Empire Donald Quartaert, editor Consumption Studies and the History of the Ottoman Empire State University of New York Press (2000) Lord Kinross, Ataturk A biography of Mustafa Kemal, father of modern Turkey, William Morrow and Company, New York, (1978) Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire, Morrow Quill Paperbacks, New York, (1977) Mehmet Maksudoglu, Osmanli History 1289-1922, International Islamic University, Malaysia (1999) Phillip E. Moseley, Russian Diplomacy and the opening of the Eastern Question in 1838-1839, Harvard, (1934) Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Cambridge University Press (1991)